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[L. A. No. 24629. In Bank. Nov. 5, 1957.] 
WILLIAM (BILL) ATKINSON et at, Petitioners, v. THE 
SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Re-
Ipondent; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSI-
CIANS et aI., Real Parties in Interest. 
[L. A. No. 24630. In Bank. Nov. 5,1951.] 
JOHN H. ANDERSON, JR., et a1., Petitioners, v. THE SU-
PERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Re-
Ipondent; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSI-
CIANS et at, Real Parties in Interest. 
[1] lIlandamus-To Oourts.-Mandamus is an appropriate remedy 
to compel the superior court to assume jurisdiction over peti-
tioners' application for preliminary injunction and· appoint-
ment of a receiver, unless an appeal from an order denying the 
motion for preliminary injunction constitutes a plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 10B6.) 
[2] Id.-Jlearing in Supreme Oourt.-Where no purpose but de-
lay would be served by reviewing a decision of the District 
Court of Appeal in a mandamus proceeding that the remedy 
by appeal was inadequate, the Supreme Court, OD granting 
petitions for hearing by the real parties in interest, may ac-
cept such decision for the purposes of the proceedings before 
it. 
[3] Process-Service on Nonresidents.-Personal service outside 
the state on a nonresident trustee of a fund set up by a resi-
[8] See Oal.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, 125; Am.Jur., 
Process, § 78 et seq. 
McX. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, §144, 65; [2] Mandamus, 
§ 111; [8,7J Process, § 33; [4,5, B, 9] Conflict of Laws, §lB; [6] 
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dent union is sufficient to give the superior court jurisdiction 
to adjudicate his right to receive payments under collective 
bargaining contracts which members of the union claim should 
be paid to them rather than the trustee. 
[4] Oon4ict of Laws - Personal Property - Sltus.-Employers' 
obligation to make certain payments under collective bargain-
ing contracts with a union is a chose in action and is personal 
property within the meaning of Code Civ. Proe., § 17, suM. 3; 
being an intangible it has no situs in fact. 
[6] Id.-Personal Property-Situs.-An intangible, unlike real or 
tangible personal property, has no physical characteristics that 
would serve as a basis for assigning it to a particular locality; 
the location assigned to it depends on what action is to be 
taken with reference to it. 
(6] Judgments-On Oonstructive Service.-Code Civ. Proe., § 417, 
permitting a personal judgment on service by publication over 
a person outside the state only if he was personally served 
with a copy of the summons and complaint and was a resident 
of the state at the time of the commencement of the action 
or at the time of service, precludes the entry of a personal 
judgment against a trustee who was served outside the state 
but who is not and has not been a resident of the state. 
[7] Process-Service on Nonresidents.---'"There is no distinction be· 
tween jurisdiction to take over a nonresident's claim to a chose 
in action admittedly his and jurisdiction to establish that it 
was never his; in both situations the nonresident can protect 
his interest in the property only by submitting to the juris. 
diction of the court. 
[8] Con4ict of Laws-Personal Properly-Intangibles.-In the 
case of intangibles, jurisdiction must be determined in the light 
of the totality of contacts with the state involved. 
[Da, 9b] Id. - Personal Property - Intangibles. - In actions by 
members of a resident union against the union, a nonresident 
trustee of a fund set up by the union, and the respective em· 
ployers, where an obligation owed by the employers under 
collective bargaining agreements which plaintiffs sought to 
enforce grew out of their employment in this state, and where '. 
it was alleged that their right to payments wider such agree-
ments to be consideration for work performed in this state and 
that diversion of such payments to the trust would be violative 
of their rights, fairness to plaintiffs demanded that they be 
able to reach the fruits of their labors before they were re-
moved from the state, and fairness to those defendants, who 
were personally ~fore the court, demanded that the conflicting 
[4] See oal.Jnr.fd, Con1lict of Laws, § 42; Am.Jv., Con1lict of 
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claims of the trustee be subject to final adjudication, and the 
multiple contacts within this state sustained the jurisdiction of 
the superior court to exercise quasi itt rem jurisdiction over 
the intangibles in question. 
[10] United Sta.tes Oourta-Oo~current Jurisdiction of Federal and 
Sta.te Oourts.-A remedy that a federal court may provide 
without violating due process of law does not become unfair 
or unjust because it is sought in a state court instead. 
PROCEEDINGS in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County to assume and exercise jurisdiction 
with respect to applications for preliminary injunction and 
appointment of receiver. Writ granted. 
John W. Preston, Harold A. Fendler and Daniel A. Weber 
for Petitioners. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Bodkin, Breslin & Luddy, Henry Kaiser, Emanuel L. 
Gordon, Michael G. Luddy, O'Melveny & Myers, Homer I. 
Mitchell, Charles G. Bakaly. Jr., Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 
Guy Knupp, Loeb & Loeb, Alfred I. Rothman and Averill C. 
Pasarow for Real Parties in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Separate class actions were brought by two 
groups of musicians attacking the validity of collective bar-
gaining contracts between their employers and the American 
Federation of Musicians and certain trust agreements related 
thereto. One action is on behalf of the employees of various 
motion picture companies and the other is on behalf of the 
employees of various phonograph record companies. The gist 
of plaintiffs' complaints is that in violation of its duty as 
their collective bargaining agent and in fraud of their rights 
the federation contracted with the employers that certain 
royalty payments and payments for reuse of motion pictures 
on television should be paid to a trustee for specified trust 
purposes instead of to the employees. 
Plaintiffs allege that these payments constitute wages earned 
by the employees and that their diversion to the trust is 
violative of their rights; that the purpose of the trust is to 
contribute to the public knowledge and appreciation of music 
throughout the U~ited States and Canada, and the trustee 
is authorized and,directed to expend the trust funds in present-
ing personal performances by instrumental musicians. to 
/ 
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which the public is admitted without charge; that the trust 
arrangement diverts wages earned by California employees, 
members of Local Number 47, for the benefit of federation 
members elsewhere without corresponding benefit to plaintiffs 
from the operation of similar arrangements made elsewhere j 
that the employers are willing to make the payments to their 
employees, but for their agreements with the federation to 
make the payments to the trustee; and that the national execu-
tive officers of the federation insisted on this arrangement 
for the selfish purpose of perpetuating themselves in office 
and of maintaining their hold and control over the affairs of 
the federation and used the trust fund to win the support 
of officials of the federation's locals and member musicians 
throughout the United States and Canada, who vastly out-
number plaintiffs and are not employed by the employers here 
involved. 
In each action, the federation, the trustee, and the respective 
employers are named as defendants. Plaintiffs seek a declara-
tion of the invalidity of the collective bargaining agreement 
and their right to the payments either as beneficiaries of a 
constructive trust or on the ground that the payments con-
stitute wages withheld in violation of sections 222 and 224 
of the Labor Code. They also seek damages against the 
federation for breach of its duty to them. At the commence-
ment of the actions they moved for the appointment of a re-
ceiver to collect the payments and preliminary injunctions to 
prevent the employers from making the payments to the 
trustee. The employers have been personally served with 
process in this state, and personal jurisdiction has been ob-
tained over the federation. The trustee was served pursuant 
to court order by delivery of summonses and complaints and 
motion papers within the State of New York, but he has not 
appeared. 
The trial court held that insofar as plaintiffs sought to 
intercept the delivery of payments to the trustee by the ap-
pointment of a receiver and temporary injunctions, the trustee 
was an indispensable party and that the court had no juris-
diction to grant plaintiffs' motions for provisional relief 
without personal jurisdiction over the trustee. It was care-
ful to point out that its ruling was based solely on lack of 
jurisdiction and stated that "if the court had jurisdiction 
to do so, the exerciiSe of a sound discretion would probRbly 
require the granting of a preliminary injunction and perhaps 
the appointment of a receiver .••• " 
342 ATKINSON v. SUPERIOR COURT [49 C.2d 
Some of the plaintiffs in each of the actions then filed their 
petitions for writs of mandate in the District Court of Ap· 
peal, Second Appellate District. The Second Division of that 
court issued alternative writs of mandate and after a hear-
ing filed its decision in each case "commanding respondent 
superior court to assume and exercise jurisdiction over peti-
tioners' application for preliminary injunction and appoint-
ment of receiver as prayed herein." Petitions for hearing by 
the real parties in interest, the defendant employers and 
federation, were then granted by this court~ 
[1] The writ of mandate is an appropriate remedy unless 
an appeal from each order denying the motion for a pre-
liminary injunction constitutes" a plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086; Financial lndem. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 45 Ca1.2d 395, 399 [289 P.2d 233J.) [2] Peti· 
tioners alleged in their petitions before the District Court 
that the remedy by appeal was not adequate because of thE' 
necessity of prompt action to prevent further movement of 
funds out of the jurisdiction of the superior court. Since no 
purpose but delay would be served at this time by reviewing 
the District Court's decision that the remedy by appeal was 
inadequate, we accept it for the purposes of these proceedings. 
(Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Ca1.2d 574, 582 [283 P.2d 7041.) 
[3] We have concluded that personal service upon the 
trustee in New York was sufficient to give the court juris-
diction to adjudicate his right to receive payments under the 
contracts here involved. Code of Civil Procedure, section 
412, provides: "Where the person on whom service is to be 
made resides out of the State . . . and it . . . appears . . . 
that it is an action which relates to or the subject of which is 
real or personal property in this State, in which such person 
defendant . . . has or claims a lien or interest, actual or con-
tingent, therein, or in which the relief demanded consist 
wholly or in part in excluding such person . . . from any in-
terest therein, such court, or judge, may make an order that 
the service be made by the pUblication of the summons." 
Section 413 provides that personal service outside the state 
is equivalent to publication. [4] Plaintiffs claim that the 
employers' obligation to make the payments involved is one 
owing to them instead of to the trustee. That obligation is a 
chose in action and is therefore personal property within the 
meaning of the stat'litory provisions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 17. 
subd. 3.) Being an intangible, it has no situs in fact. 
[5] " An intangible, unlike real or tangible personal property, 
) 
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has no physical characteristics that would serve as a basis for 
assigning it to a particular locality. The location assigned 
to it depends on what action is to be taken with reference to 
it." (Estate of Waits, 23 Ca1.2d 676, 680 [146 P.2d 5].) The 
question presented, therefore, is whether the chose in action 
in question may be treated as being within this state within 
the meaning of section 412 for purposes of exercising in rem 
or quasi in rem jurisdiction over it in these actions. 
Plaintiffs rely on cases holding that having jurisdiction over 
the obligor, the state has po\ver to enforce the obligation and 
cut off the right, if any, of a nonresident claimant thereto 
without personal jurisdiction over the nonresident. Garnish-
ment proceedings (Ha1-ris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 [25 S.Ct. 625, 
49 L.Ed. 1023]) and escheat proceedings (Standard Oil 00. 
v. New Jersey. 341 U.S. 428 [71 8. Ct. 822, 95 L.Ed. 1078] ; 
Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (44 S.Ct. 108, 
68 L.Ed. 301, 31 A.L.R. 391]) are examples of the exercise 
of such power. Defendants contend, however, that in the 
case of ordinary choses in action such power is limited to 
situations in which the local claimant admits the validity of 
the local debtor's obligation to the nonresident and seeks to 
reach the interest he admits is the property of the nonresident. 
They point out that in the present case plaintiffs are not 
seeking to reach property admittedly belonging to the trustee 
but are claiming that the obligation is owed only to them. 
Defendants rely on cases holding that the debtor cannot treat 
his own obligation as property where he is, when his purpose 
is to terminate a nonresident's claim against him (Vanderb'ilt 
v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 [77 S.Ct. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1456] ; 
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 [68 S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561, 
1 A.L.R.2d 1412]), and they contend that the rule is the same 
when the debtor seeks to interplead both a local and a non-
resident claimant. (New York Life Ins. 00. v. Dunlevy, 241 
U.S. 518 [36 S.Ct. 613, 60 L.Ed. 1140].) In their view it is 
immaterial in an action to adjudicate conflicting claims to an 
obligation, whether the action is commenced by the obligor, 
where only one of the claimants can be served, or is com-
menced by one of the claimants, where he can secure personal 
jurisdiction over the obligor but not over the rival claimant. 
We find no controlling precedent of the United States Su-
preme Court. It is true that in the Dunlevy case creditors 
of one of the s:laimants to the insurance proceeds had gar-
nisheed Mrs. Dunlevy's interest before the insurance company 
sought to interplead the local claimants with Mrs. Dunlevy 
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who was absent, but the court was careful to point out that 
the interpleader action "initiated by the company was an 
altogether different matter" from the garnishment proceed-
ings and that under the applicable state law a judgment 
exonerating the garnishee was not binding on the absent 
debtor whose claim against the garnishee the local creditors 
had unsuccessfully attempted to reach. (241 U.S. 518, 520-
521.) Defendants rely on language in Bank of Jasper v. First 
Nat. Bank, 258 U.S. 112, 118-119 [42 S.Ct. 202, 66 L.Ed. 490], 
suggesting a distinction for jurisdictional purposes between an 
action to reach a debt owed an absent defendant and an action 
seeking to establish that the debt is owed directly to the plain-
tiff instead of to the absent claimant. In the Bank of Jasper 
case, however, the obligation had been embodied in a nego-
tiable certificate of deposit that was not within the jurisdic-
tion of the court, and the Supreme Court summarized its 
holding by stating that" As neither the certificates of deposit 
nor the holder thereof were within the State of Florida, its 
courts could not-in the absence of consent-acquire jurisdic-
tion to determine the liability of maker to holder." Accord-
ingly, that case is not controlling here where the obligation 
has not been embodied in a negotiable docum~nt. 
Decisions of other courts involving conflicting claims to 
choses in action, where the action has been commenced by one 
claimant who has secured personal jurisdiction over the debtor 
but not over the absent claimant, are in conflict as to whether 
there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the absent claimant's rights. 
(See, e.g., sustaining or indicating jurisdiction: Cameron v. 
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 N.J. Eq. 24 [161 A. 55,60] ; 116 
N.J. Eq. 311 [173 A. 344, 346] ; Ely v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 
128 Ky. 799 [110 S.W. 265, 268] ; State ex reI. Richardson v. 
MueUer, 230 Mo.App. 962 [90 S.W.2d 171, 174-176]; Omaha 
Nat. Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 26 F.2d 884, 887-889; 
Feucktwanger v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 288 N.Y. 
342 [43 N.E.2d 434, 435] ; First Nat. Bank v. Bank of Horatio, 
161 Ark. 259 [255 S.W. 881, 882]; Taylor v. Security Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 38 Misc. 575 [77 N.Y.S. 1012, 1013] ; Oishei v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co., 117 App.Div. 110 [102 N.Y.S. 368, 371], 
aff'd, 191 N.Y. 544 [85 N.E. 1113] ; Morgan v. Mutual Benefit 
Life Ins. Co., 189 N.Y. 447 [82 N.E. 438, 441] ; Kumor v. Scot-
tish Union & Nat,Ins. Co., 47 Wyo. 174 [33 P.2d 916, 920-
922] ; Bush v. MiSsouri State Life Ins. Co., 86 Okla. 182 [207 
P. 317, 319J; Mutual Home Assn. v. Zwatchka, (Tex. Civ. 
App.) 297 S.W. 317, 318; Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522 
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[182 S.W. 577, 578, L.R.A. 1917B 385] j Shef"m(Jln Nat. Bank 
v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 238 F. 225, 229; Morgan v. Mutual 
etc. I"",. Co., 16 Cal.App. 85, 90-93 [116 P. 385]. Denying 
or indicating no jurisdiction: Mahr v. Norwich Union Fire 
1"",. Soc., 127 N.Y. 452, 460-462 [28 N.E. 391} j Kelly v. Nor-
wich Union Fire Ins. Co., 82 Iowa 137 [47 N.W. 986, 987] j 
Royal Neighbors of America v. Fletcher, 99 Okla. 297 [227 
P. 426, 429] ; Cross v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio 613 [10 N.E. 160, 
164-166] ; Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Goodling, 19 Tex.Civ. 
App.490 [49 S.W. 123, 127]; Redzina v. Provident 1M. for 
Savings, 96 N.J.Eq. 346 [125 A. 133, 136] ; McBride v. OM-
land, 89 N.J.Eq. 314 [104 A. 435, 436]; Austin v. Royal 
League, 316 Ill. 188 [147 N.E. 106, 109] ; Schoenhols v. New 
York Life I"",. Co., 197 App.Div. 91 [188 N.Y.S. 596] ; Eisner 
v. Williams, 298 Mich. 215 [298 N.W. 507, 509-510] ; Stock-
bridge v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 F. 558, 560.) 
In the absence of a settled rule governing the situation be-
fore us, and in light of the fact that an intangible may be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of the court without personal 
jurisdiction over all of the parties involved for some pur-
poses but not for others, we eonclude that the solution must 
be sought in the general prineiples governing j.urisdiction 
over persons and property rather than in an attempt to 
assign a fictional situs to intangibles. 
It is significant that with respeet to jurisdietion to tax 
intangibles (Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 373-374 [59 
S.Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339, 123 A.L.R. 162]), jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 316 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057] ; 
Perkins v. Booguet Mw.. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 [72 s.et. 413, 
96 L.Ed. 485]), and jurisdiction to adjudicate trust obliga-
tions (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank ~ Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 311-313 [70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865]), emphasis is ' 
no longer placed on actual or physical presenee but on the 
bearing that local eontacts have to the question of over-all 
fair play and substantial justice. A similar ehange in em-
phasis has been taking place with respect to personal jurisdic-
tion over individuals. (Cf., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 
[24 L.Ed. 565]; with Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-
463 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357] ; Hess v. 
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352.[47 S.Ct. 632,71 L.Ed. 1091] ; Allen 
v. Superior Court, 41 Ca1.2d 306, 310-313 [259 P.2d 905]; 
.'" rlgrJn v. Miller, 11 !Il.2d 378 r143 N.E.2d 673] ; see Smyth 
v. Twin State Imp. Corp., 116 Vt. 569 [80 A.2d 664, 25 A.L.R. 
) 
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2d 1193}.) "But now that the capias ad respondendum has 
giyen way to personal service of summons or other form of 
notice, due process require,s only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum 
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend I traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.' It (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 
326 U.S. 310, 316.) 
[6] In the present case, since the trustee is.·not and has not 
been a resident of California, section 417 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure precludes the entry of a personal judgment against 
him, and it is therefore unneces.'.ary to determine whether· his 
activities as trustee have sufficient connection with this state 
constitutionally to justify an assumption of personal jurisdic-
tion without service of process here. The relevant contacts 
with this state are significant, however, in deciding whether 
due process permits exercising a more limited or quasi in rem 
jurisdiction to determine his and plaintiffs' interests in the 
intangibles in question. 
[7] We find no relevance in the distincti()n defendants 
seek to make between jurisdiction to take over a nonresident's 
claim to a chose in action admittedly his and jurisdiction to 
establish that it was never his. In both situations the non-
resident can protect his interest in the property only by 
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. It is true that in 
the former situation he must litigate a controversy solely 
between himself and his creditor unrelated to preexisting 
rights in the obligation garnished, whereas in the latter situa-
tion preexisting conflicting rights to the obligation itself are 
involved; but this distinction alone has no bearing on the 
fairness of making him appear. It has been rejected in a case 
involving both real and personal property including intan-
gibles (Loaiza v. Superior COIl,rt, 85 Cal. 11, 34·35 [24 P. 
707, 20 Am.St.Rep. 197, 9 L.R.A. 376]), and does not exist 
with respect to controversies over corporate stock. (Jellenik 
v. Huron Copper Min. Co., 177 U.S. I, 12-13 [20 S.Ot. 559, 
44 L.Ed. 647] ; Wait v. Kern River Min. etc. Co., 157 Cal. 16. 
21 [106 P. 98] ; Amparo Min. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 75 
N.J.Eq. 555 [73 A. 249, 250.251]; Michigan Trust Co. v. 
Probasco, 29 Ind.App. 109 [63 N.E. 255, 251].) It is true 
that for some P'll'poses the state of incorporation may 
be peculiarly appropriate for the purpose of litigating con-
flicting claims to corporate stock, but if so, it is because of 
-) 
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relevant contacts there; if such contacts exist elsewhere, 
jurisdiction also follows. (lV ait v. Kern River Min. etc. Co .• 
supra, 157 Cal. 16, 21.) [8] Similarly, in the case of other in· 
tangibles, jurisdiction must be determined in the light of the 
totality of contacts with the state involved. Indeed, many of 
the apparently conflicting decisions on the question before us 
could be reconciled on their facts, if not their language, on 
this basis. (C/., e.g., Omaha Nat. Bank v. Federal Reserve 
Bank, 26 F.2d 884, 887·889; Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover 
Bank ct Trust Co., 288 N.Y. 342 [43 N.E.2d 434. 435] ; First 
Nat. Bank v. Bank 0/ Horatio, 161 Ark. 259 [255 S.W. 881, 
882] ; Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Li/e 1m. Co., 189 N.Y. 447 
[82 N.E. 438. 440·441] ; Kumor v. Scottish Union ct Nat. Ins. 
Co., 47 Wyo. 174 [33 P.2d 916, 920·922) ; Perry v. Young, 133 
Tenn. 522 [182 S.W. 577,578] ; with Mahr v. Norwich Union 
Fire Ins. Soc., 127 N.Y. 452, 460·462; Cross v. Armstrong, 44 
Ohio 613 [10 N.E. 160, 164] ; Eisner v. Williams, 298 Mich. 
215 [298 N.W. 507, 509·510].) 
[9a] The present case is not one in which an obligor has 
invoked the jurisdiction of a court remote from the obligee 
solely for the purpose of terminating his obligation (see 
Estin v. Estin, supra; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbut, supra) or 
sought to compel conflicting claimants to adjudicate their 
rights in a forum of his own choice. (See New York Li/e 1m. 
Co. v. Dunlevy, supra.) The obligation plaintiffs seek to en· 
force grows out of their employment by defendants here. The 
payments involved are alleged to be consideration for work 
performed in this state. The federation defendant is before 
the court. Under these circumstances, fairness to plaintiffs 
demands that they be able to reach the fruits of their labors 
before they are removed from the state. Moreover, fairness 
to the defendants who are personally before the court also 
demands that the conflicting claims of the trustee be subject 
. to final adjudication. Even if we were to hold that his absence 
prevents the granting of the provisional remedies here sought, 
plaintiffs would not be foreclosed thereby from asserting that 
payment to him did not discharge the employers' obligation 
to them and that the federation was independently liable for 
damages for breach of its fiduciary duty. The evil of ex· 
posing the obligor to actions to enforce the same obligation 
in two jurisdictions with the attendant risk of double lia-
bility would not 'be obviated. It was just such double lia-
bility that was sustained in the Dunlevy case anl~ gave im-
petus to the passage of federal interpleader legislation. (See 
I 
, 
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Chafee, Interstate Interpleader, 33 Yale L.J. 685, 711.) It is 
doubtful whether today the United States Supreme Court 
would deny to a state court the interstate interpl0ader juris-
diction that federal courts may exercise. [10] A remedy 
that a federal court may provide without violating due 
process of law does not become unfair or unjust because it is 
sought in a state court instead. To sustain jurisdiction in 
these cases, however, we are not required to forecast the over-
ruling of the Dunlevy case and to act on that basis. [9b] For 
the reasons stated above, this case is clearly distinguishable 
from the Dunlevy case, and the multiple contacts with this 
state fully sustain the jurisdiction of the superior court to 
exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over the intangibles in ques-
tion. 
Let the writ of mandate issue in each case commanding 
respondent superior court to assume and exercise jurisdiction 
over petitioners' application for a preliminary injunction and 
the appointment of a receiver as prayed herein. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., . 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
